international human rights law has a well-developed body of jurisprudence that, this Article argues, ought to have been advanced by counsel for the petitioners. This Article both exposes the potentially significant international human rights law arguments that could have been advanced, and explores some possible reasons for the marginalization of this body of law. The Article concludes that this strategic decision on the part of counsel for the petitioners robbed the U.S. Supreme Court of an opportunity to assert the relevance of human rights law to the "War on Terrorism," and to expand on the relationship between international and domestic constitutional standards and, for those reasons, is to be lamented.
*** It was my pleasure to prepare this Paper for a conference honoring the work of David Kretzmer, whose commitment to human rights has resulted in a body of work as deep and thought-provoking as it is broad and insightful. This honor was only matched by the pleasure of finally meeting David at the conference; a pleasure that I have since enjoyed once more and which I hope to have on many future occasions.
***
I. Introduction
Guantánamo Bay and the rights of those detained there are among the most enduring controversies in the "War on Terrorism." One of the primary areas of concern has been the apparent unavailability of habeas corpus to those detained as "enemy combatants" until the cessation of hostilities; a point in time that even the United States' administration accepts may be impossible to identify. 1 On December 5, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the latest cases to assert habeas corpus rights for these detainees--Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, the decision in which was handed down in June 2008.
2 Interestingly, the arguments presented to the Court both orally and in the written submissions gave scant attention to international law and none at all to international human rights law (IHRL). This is surprising when one considers that IHRL has a well developed and contextually appropriate body of jurisprudence to be drawn on in relation to the two primary issues in the case: the geographical reach of rights-protecting provisions, and the essential elements of habeas corpus or adequate alternative.
Not only does IHRL have a well-developed jurisprudential corpus that would have served a prudential purpose in this case by adding another string to the petitioners' bow, but it is also an appropriately formulated body of law to rely on when assessing the appropriate level of individual rights in the context of counter-terrorism. Unlike many domestic legal systems-including the United States' 3 -IHRL has an in-built emergency structure comprising derogation processes that offers a clear delimitation of allowable "security-motivated" action. IHRL not only offered additional authority for use by counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene, but also represents principles and doctrines of law that have been designed to ensure an achievable, sustainable, proportionate and appropriate balance between individual rights and the security- prerogatives of the state. 4 As outlined in Part III below, there is no reason in law for the exclusion of IHRL argumentation-in fact, by analogy with the principles for consideration of comparative law in constitutional interpretation, reference to international human rights would have been entirely appropriate in this case. 5 This Article outlines the ignored jurisprudence and laments its exclusion from the litigation, particularly since this was not required by domestic law and denied the Supreme Court the opportunity to consider the appropriate relationship between constitutional and international rights protecting norms in times of conflict. Part II offers a background to the Boumediene and Al Odah litigation, including outlining the shortcomings in the review mechanisms available to those detained in Guantánamo Bay. Part III outlines the human rights law arguments that, it is proposed, ought to have been made in this case. These arise in two contexts-first, in relation to the extraterritorial reach of human rights law which, it is argued, could substantiate a claim for the application of constitutional rights to Guantánamo Bay; second, in relation to the content of habeas corpus which, it is argued, could have been advanced as indicators of the adequacy of a provided review mechanism to satisfy the constitutional right to habeas corpus or "adequate alternative." Part IV then considers a number of reasons for the omission of IHRL, and shows that none of these possible motivations are convincing. The Article concludes (Part V) that the failure to argue IHRL in this latest Guantánamo Bay case is a missed opportunity to establish a more harmonious concert between the rights of suspected terrorist detainees under U.S. constitutional law and IHRL.
II. A Little Background to Boumediene and Al Odah
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court had been asked to decide on the availability of habeas corpus to suspected terrorists detained in Guantánamo Bay. 
Rasul
17 decisions and considered in some depth below, 18 the detainees claimed that they were in fact entitled to habeas corpus or an adequate alternative under the U.S. Constitution, and that the CSRT and judicial review thereof did not constitute such an "adequate alternative." 19 The challenge, therefore, involved two primary questions: (a) does the U.S. Constitution extend to Guantánamo Bay, resulting in those detained there being constitutional rights-bearers?; and (b) what constitutes an "adequate alternative" to habeas corpus? 20 Counsel for the petitioners based their argumentation on these matters largely on leasehold and sovereignty, in relation to the first question, 21 and on the common law of habeas corpus in relation to the second.
22
The naval base in Guantánamo Bay in which the petitioners and other suspected terrorists are or were held is under the leasehold ownership of the United States by virtue of a perpetual lease formed through two treaty agreements between the U.S. and Cuba.
23 This lease can be terminated by the United States only and, although it recognizes Cuba's continuing sovereignty over the base, expressly grants the U.S. exclusive jurisdiction over the base. Thus, as counsel for the petitioners argued, any activities undertaken in the base-even by a Cuban national who might be working there-are governed by U.S. federal law and not actionable in Cuban courts. 24 26 therefore subject to at least some constitutional governance, particularly in relation to fundamental individual liberties such as the right to habeas corpus. It is worth noting, however, that although what I class "the territorial approach" 27 to constitutionalizing Guantánamo was largely successful in this case 28 and is based in the familiar municipal conceptions of property, leasehold, and territorial jurisdiction, it carried with it a number of risks. Robert Chesney sums these risks up well when he writes:
[m]ight the extension of a robust form of judicial review to Guantánamo detainees cause the government to rely more than it otherwise would on detention facilities in Afghanistan and elsewhere, which are not only less secure and convenient, but also less transparent and less likely to be subjected successfully to litigation of any kind? 29 The territorial approach relied upon by counsel for the petitioners in this case, although successful in the instant proceedings, may thus endanger future detainees and deter the government from transferring future detainees to Guantánamo Bay or any other areas outside of the United States over which the U.S. may have analogous perpetual leasehold proprietorship. 30 authority" approach, based on international legal principles of extra-territoriality, appears to offer more promise of ensuring that individuals are detained as 'enemy combatants' only when there is an evidence-based belief of involvement in terrorism that requires detention as a matter of national security, and when this belief can be effectively challenged, through an adversarial process.
In relation to the argument that the current review system was "inadequate," counsel for the petitioners argued that habeas corpus as it was in 1789 allowed for substantive and effective review that was not afforded to the petitioners, and without which the current system could not fulfil the constitutional requirement of habeas corpus or adequate alternative. 32 To this end, counsel was not only ignoring a vast body of jurisprudence from IHRL on the essential elements of effective review, 33 but also conceding that constitutional standards are not to be informed by contemporary international developments. Given that the operation of the detention facility in Guantánamo Bay is said to be required by and structured in the light of a novel and substantially "new" set of circumstances, 34 the decision to argue adequacy almost exclusively by these 1789 standards appears short-sighted. Without doubt, the en vogue nature of originalism in constitutional interpretation in the United States warranted attention to such a line of argument, 35 but concentration thereon to the exclusion of IHRL standards deprived the litigation of valuable and contextuallyappropriate conceptions of habeas corpus drawn from international institutions, considering habeas corpus for suspected terrorists in times of crisis. 36 As considered below, arguments drawing on international legal doctrine and principle would have afforded significant "added value" to those actually advanced and ought not to have been ignored by counsel. 
B. The Available Review
It was originally the case that those detained in Guantánamo Bay had no mechanism to have the lawfulness of their detention there reviewed: they were classified as "enemy combatants" by the Executive, which then asserted a right to detain them "until the cessation of hostilities."
37 As a result of both Hamdi 38 and Rasul, 39 however, it became clear that some review mechanism would have to be afforded to suspected terrorist detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. While the Supreme Court in both of these cases accepted that the Executive could, in fact, detain "enemy combatants" until the hostilities had ceased or until they no longer posed a threat to the security of the United States, the Justices also stressed the importance of ensuring that those detained have some mechanism of review available to them. As a result, CSRTs, which are now primarily regulated by the Detainee Treatment Act 2005, 40 were established.
41
All those who appear before CSRTs are presumptively classified as enemy combatants, 42 and the function of the review is merely to establish whether or not that classification is still appropriate, which in turn defines whether or not continued detention is justifiable. These reviews, which take place in Guantánamo Bay, are non-adversarial and administrative in nature. The tribunal itself comprises three commissioned officers, who are to be "neutral," 43 although they are not military judges and only one of them is required to be a lawyer. 44 These members must then determine whether "the preponderance of evidence" supports the conclusion that the detainee is an enemy combatant, with evidence adduced by the government enjoying a rebuttable presumption of being genuine and accurate. 45 The tribunal is "not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law," 46 but rather, can consider any evidence deemed to be both relevant and helpful to the matter under consideration. 47 Although both parties may present evidence, and indeed the Tribunal is to consider evidence from both sides, there is no obligation to disclose evidence as between the parties, which compounds the plight of a detainee who is without counsel, and whose information flow is largely determined by whatever mail receipt rules are approved in his particular case. The detainee may call witnesses at his tribunal, but is not guaranteed that those witnesses will be secured for the proceedings as appearance is limited to those who are "reasonably available,"
48 affecting not only the capacity to examine military officers who may have been involved in the capture, detention and interrogation of the detainee, but also individuals who may have relevant information but whose exact whereabouts or even full name might not be known to the detainee. The essentially illusory nature of the right to call, examine and cross-examine witnesses is borne out by the empirical study of Denbeaux and Denbeaux who found that the government never relied on testimony at a CSRT hearing.
49
Detainees are given only limited notice of the review date, 50 frequently do not understand that this is a review as opposed to another form of interrogation, 51 and are not provided with legal counsel. Rather than being entitled to the services of a lawyer, detainees are provided with a "personal representative" whose chief role is to "assist the detainee in connection with the review process." 52 However, the role of the representative may not be clear to the detainee. Section C obligates informing the detainee that the representative is not the detainee's advocate. 53 Moreover, the 45 Id. at sect. G(11). 46 Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section G(9). 47 Id. 50 The review must take place within 30 days of the detainee being given notice-England Memorandum, see supra note 41, at section d. 51 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 49, at 16. 52 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42 at section c. 53 See England Memorandum, supra note 41, at enclosure (3) 3.
representative is a military officer, 54 and in reality the role of the representative is to visit with the detainee and read a list of the accusations against him on the basis of which the detainee is being held. 55 As this is generally the same list of accusations as the detainee has responded to in numerous interrogations, the blurred lines between interrogation and review are arguably further distorted in the eyes of the detainee by the involvement of the personal representative, exacerbating the difficulties detainees face in making out a viable case before a CSRT.
The decision of a CSRT is subject to limited review in the U.S. federal courts, at which point in a proceeding the detainee will have access to legal representation. The Detainee Treatment Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "to determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant." 56 This does not allow for a substantive hearing on the merits, however. Rather, the Court of Appeals is statutorily limited to considering whether the CSRT in question made its determination in a manner "consistent with the standards and procedures" specified for CSRTs, and whether the application of these standards is consistent with "the Constitution and laws of the United States" to the extent to which those laws are deemed applicable.
57 This is clearly an extremely restrictive review, particularly if the Court of Appeals were to find that the Constitution did not apply-as was the status quo ante at the time of the Supreme Court argumentation in Boumediene. The fact that the Military Commissions Act 2006 itself attempts also to preclude reliance on international law as a source of rights in these reviews of the CSRT decisions, makes the inadequacy of the review mechanism even more evident.
58
This procedure-CSRT with limited review in the federal courts-was the sole review mechanism available in statute to those detained in Guantánamo Bay. Although the Supreme Court found that federal courts have statutory habeas corpus 54 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section c. 55 See supra note 50. 56 Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 40, at section 1005 (e)(2)(a). 57 Id. at section 1005 (e)(2)(c) 58 which provides-in unequivocal terms-that federal courts have no jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions lodged by enemy combatants and that this "jurisdiction stripping" provision has retrospective effect. 62 Thus, the Boumediene litigation represented an important challenge to the combined decision of Congress and the Executive to exclude the judiciary from determinations as to detention in the War on Terrorism. If, on the one hand, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling under review, 63 (i.e., that Section 7 is an effective stripping provision and there is no federal habeas corpus) then Guantánamo Bay detainees would have been reliant solely on the statutory processes outlined above. If, on the other hand, the Court found that the Constitution applies in Guantánamo, it would then proceed to assess the adequacy of these statutory proceedings to act as a constitutionally acceptable alternative to habeas corpus.
III. Human Rights Law Arguments
Following an exchange of various applications and petitions by both parties, in which the arguments outlined above, are made out, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Boumediene on Dec. 5, 2007. Of primary interest in this Article, is the distinct absence in both the documentary submissions and the oral argumentation, of reference to international human rights standards. The transcript of the oral hearings features no reference to IHRL whatsoever. 64 International law fares only marginally better in the documentary briefs submitted by the parties, where once more IHRL features not at all. The original Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al. 65 focuses on international law in respect of cessation of Guantánamo Bay 66 and the concept and definition of "enemy combatant." 67 The Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al. 68 invokes international law only inasmuch as it refers to the Geneva Conventions. 69 The Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et. al. 70 similarly invokes only international humanitarian law (both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law) when considering whether the United States has lawful authority to detain the particular detainees at all, particularly in relation to the concept of direct participation in hostilities. 71 The only reply brief to make any meaningful reference to international law is Reply Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al. 72 which states, that "CSRTs are not contemplated or governed by international law and are not sufficient under international or U.S. law to justify detention without meaningful judicial review in territory under the exclusive, and effectively permanent jurisdiction of the United States" 73 but does not specify whether this conclusion is drawn from international humanitarian law, IHRL, or both.
The absence of sustained IHRL argumentation is striking given the fact that the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 74 in 1992 and has not entered any War on Terrorism related derogations, and given the potential for principles of IHRL to play an exceptionally effective persuasive role in relation to both the "reach" of U.S. constitutional standards and the content of those standards. This is not to say that IHRL would have trumped constitutional or, indeed, legislative standards in the case. The argument of this Article is that IHRL offered a rich source of argumentation as to the possible interpretation of the 64 See supra note 2. 65 Constitution and its geographic scope. This is particularly so given the common objectives of constitutional bills of rights and IHRL-neither body of law intends to act as a "suicide pact" or to unconscionably tie the hands of the state in times of crisis or strain; rather, both are flexible, accept the need for more restrictive measures than normal in times of strain, and recognize that individual rights flowing from individual dignity and humanity (and not from status, 75 citizenship 76 or law-abidingness) ought only to be infringed to the extent strictly necessary in a time of crisis or emergency. In constitutional terms this is particularly evident from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Matthews v. Eldridge 77 in which the Court outlined a calculus by which public good can be balanced against individual rights in order to identify the scope of entitlements. This calculus was cited by O'Connor J. in Hamdi. 78 In international law, human rights law has long emphasized the need for international legal standards to take prevailing circumstances into account both where derogations have been entered and where they have not been entered but where the prevailing circumstances require some additional flexibility on the part of IHRL.
79 Given these commonalities, recourse to principles of IHRL in Boumediene and Al Odah would have been appropriate.
A. Extra-Territorial Application
States' obligations to comply with IHRL extend beyond their immediate geographic territory and to all areas within their effective power or control. This part of the Article exposes some of the key decisions at U.N. and regional level outlining this principle and identifies a common concern with ensuring that human rights treaties fulfil their 75 In Hamdi the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had a habeas corpus right notwithstanding his status as a suspected terrorist "enemy combatant," protective purpose as the underlying rationale for this (admittedly exceptional) extraterritoriality.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR defines the scope of the covenant in the following terms:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
The terms of Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR are also worthy of note in this relation. Under this provision signatory parties recognize the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider communications "from individuals subject to [the state's] jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation" of the ICCPR by that state. 80 The expressed terms of Article 2(1) thus provide that individuals subject to a state's jurisdiction are rights-bearers under the Convention. This is of particular significance in the context of Guantánamo Bay given the United States' "exclusive jurisdiction" over the base. 81 On a positivistic level, therefore, there seems little scope for dispute that Guantánamo detainees are "subject to [the US'] jurisdiction." The Human Rights Committee has, however, gone beyond such apparently positivistic declarations of jurisdiction in assessing the nature of states' obligations under Article 2(1), and has found that the provision "means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party" and that "[t]his principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained." 82 This stated principle in General Comment No. 31 reflects established authority in the jurisprudence of the Committee itself.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee considered the meaning of the phrase "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction" in a number of complaints against Uruguay, 83 many of which involved claimants who had not been within the territorial jurisdiction of Uruguay at the time of the alleged violation. 84 In respect of these cases the Human Rights Committee's approach is perhaps best encapsulated in this extract from its decision in Article II of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 91 does not include any express jurisdictional scope, primarily because it is not a treaty and was not originally intended to be applied to the member states of the Organisation of American States; rather it was intended to be a non-binding document expressing aspirational standards for achievement in the region. 92 It was not until 1965, when the Inter-American Commission was given authority to hear individual complaints alleging human rights violations, that the Declaration was applied to the member states. In contrast the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man contains a jurisdictional clause: "The States Parties to the Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms …" 93 Article 1(1) is clearly distinguishable from Article 2(1) of the ICCPR because it makes no mention whatsoever of "territory" in setting out the jurisdictional scope of the treaty. While the practice of defining jurisdiction by reference to territory might suggest that the treaty is primarily applicable to those within the territory of a member state, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights clearly demonstrates a broader scope for the treaty. In the first place, the Court has established that state actors can be liable under the Inter-American human rights regime for the effect on people outside of their territorial jurisdiction of actions done inside of the territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in the Haitian Interdiction Case 94 the Commission found the United States liable for interfering with Haitians' attempts on the High Seas to seek safe haven in third countries. Although the United States argued that the prohibition on refoulement would apply only where asylum-seekers had reached the territory of a member state, the Commission referred to Soering v. United Kingdom 95 and its progeny in the European Court of Human Rights in finding the United States had breached the Declaration. In addition, all those who come within the effective control of a member state are protected by the Inter-American regime even if the relevant events take place outside of a state's territorial jurisdiction. 96 Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obliges member states to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" 97 contained within the Convention and has espoused a particularly rich jurisprudence on the extra-territorial scope of the Convention. While it has long been accepted that Article 1 lays down the principle that the Convention's application is primarily territorially limited, 98 early jurisprudence from the European Commission on Human Rights provided that states have an obligation under the treaty to secure the rights of all those under their actual authority and control including those outside of the respondent state's territorial space. 99 Article 1 jurisprudence now suggests that there are three categories of circumstance in which the Convention might have extra-territorial effect: 100 situations engaging the principle of non-refoulement, cases in which a state has effective control over a territory outside of its own territorial jurisdiction; 101 and situations where individuals come under the somewhat incidental control of a state -very often in an administrative manner-although that state may not have control over the territory in question.
In spite of the reasonably solid classification of "extra-territoriality" principles into these three genera of cases, the Grand Chamber did not consider the meaning of the jurisdiction clause in Article 1(1) of the Convention until Banković v. Belgium 103 in 2001. In this case the Court considered whether member states who were involved in the aerial bombing of Radio Televizije Srbije in April 1999, had Convention-based responsibilities towards residents of the area and concluded that no jurisdictional link between the complainants and the respondent state could be established.
The Court reiterated the principle that the Convention is primarily territorial so that extra-territorial application of the Convention is a strictly exceptional occurrence. In essence this element of Banković was a mere restatement of existing principle; the Court had laid down the same principle in its early Soering 104 decision and is perfectly in-keeping with the inclusion of a "territory clause" in Article 1. As the pre-Banković jurisprudence suggested, the exceptional circumstances in which the Convention could be applied extra-territorially fall into three categories:
[The Court's] recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a contracting state is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent state, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that government. 105 Very controversially, the Court then held that the Convention applies within a quite-strictly-delineated espace juridique comprising the territories of the member states of the Convention. 106 If, as happened in Cyprus v. Turkey, 107 individuals were in an area in which they enjoyed Convention rights, then the assumption of authority by another member state would not result in a gap in protection: rather continuity of protection could be assured by means of holding the new authority state liable for the Convention in spite of the fact that this state would be acting outside of its own territory. The Court has subsequently handed down decisions that suggest that the espace juridique principle from Banković may not in fact be as expansive as it first appears. In Öscalau v Turkey 108 for example, the Court found the respondent state bound by the Convention in respect of an individual over whom it had authority and effective control, notwithstanding the fact that the acts impugned occurred in Nairobi airport. The Banković decision notwithstanding, therefore, there remains a clear extra-territorial scope for the ECHR albeit in limited situations.
If the major human rights treaties have at least some extra-territorial application inasmuch as they can be enforced against a state for its activities outside of its own territorial borders, this may suggest something important about the nature of rights-protecting provisions and the structural requirements for their effective implementation. While the U.N. Human Rights Commission has not expanded significantly on the rationale for its application of the ICCPR extra-territorially, there are some indications in its opinions and concluding observations that suggest that the principle is necessary in order to give effect to the rights protected by the Convention. Effective implementation of rights is clearly within (if not in fact central to) the object and purpose of human rights instruments and this can therefore be classified as a purposive approach to the reach of the Convention. The purposive approach is far more clear-cut in both the Inter-American and European regimes, however. In both the Coard 109 and Armando Alejandro 110 cases the Inter-American Commission endorsed extra-territorial application of the human rights regime on the basis of the object and purpose of the Declaration and Convention.
Perhaps the most express example of the purposive approach to the physical reach of IHRL can be found in the Article 1 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In Soering the Strasbourg Court referred to the Convention's "special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms" and to the "object and purpose of the Convention" in finding that the United Kingdom had a responsibility under Article 3 to ensure, to the extent possible, that they did not transfer the complainant to a place where his Convention rights may be violated.
111 Equally in Banković the Court reasserted its longstanding purposive approach by asking "[What is] the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase "within their jurisdiction" in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the convention." 112 Post-Banković case law shows that the Court has not abandoned "object and purpose" based approaches to the scope of the Convention. In
Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia
113 the Court affirmed the principle that the Convention can apply to military operations, even where the state gains only temporary overall control of all or part of another state. 114 In Öcalan v. Turkey 115 the Court further held that the Convention could be applied when the complainants are within the "authority and control" of a member state, even if geographically the events complained of take place outside of the espace juridique of the Convention.
Thus, the concept that a state would be bound by its obligations where it is in effective control of an area-even if that area is not within the state's territorial jurisdiction-is now well established in IHRL. The rationale for this principle is the effective implementation of the objects and principles of those human rights instruments; namely, the effective protection of individual rights against unlawful, unjustifiable, and disproportionate state action that undermines and violates individual dignity. In this respect one's citizenship, behavior, race, religion, etc., do not disqualify one from the enjoyment of rights, although they may result in a re-balancing of rights in relation to a particular category of person if that is justified by the circumstances. So committed is IHRL to the universality of its application, that some rights-such as the right to be free from torture-have been elevated to the status of jus cogens rights 116 and others-such as the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention-have been deemed non-derogable by implication within discrete human rights systems. 117 If, as outlined above, constitutional bills of rights also have at their heart the object and purpose of limiting state action irrespective of the characteristics of the individual at bar, then a principle of extraordinary extra-territorial application would be apposite and the omission of this line of argumentation from Boumediene is perplexing. 
B. The Content of the Habeas Corpus Right
The second step in this case involved challenging the current review procedures operating in Guantánamo Bay, for even if the petitioners convinced the Court that they are constitutional rights bearers, the petitioners' constitutional habeas corpus entitlements would be fulfilled if the Court could be satisfied that the available review processes are an "adequate alternative" to habeas corpus. 118 In this context, again, IHRL offered the petitioners a source of law and principle concerning the vital elements of the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention and its operation in times of emergency that could have been drawn upon in order to identify the benchmarks against which the current review processes could be assessed.
All international human rights documents protect the right to be free from arbitrary detention 119 and many of them expressly protect the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention. 120 International law's concern with detention is not directed toward prohibiting detention per se; the international legal order recognizes that detention of individuals may be required in certain circumstances. Its concern, rather, is with the prevention of arbitrariness in detention. 121 One of the primary mechanisms of ensuring that one is not arbitrarily detained is the capacity to challenge that detention before a court, primarily achieved in common law jurisdictions through habeas corpus procedures. Article 5(4) of the ECHR provides that detainees "shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." Article 9(4) of the ICCPR and Article 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) are expressed in almost identical terms, while Article 5(3) of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) requires that a detainee "shall be entitled to have the lawfulness of his arrest or detention examined by a court."
122 This suggests that a judge or court ought to be able to assess compliance with procedural requirements in domestic law; the reasonableness of the suspicion that forms the basis for the detention; and the legitimacy of the purpose of detention. Habeas corpus petitions normally allow for these three levels of assessment. 123 In order to satisfy international legal obligations, detainees must have the opportunity not only to lodge a petition but to have the lawfulness of their detention substantively reviewed, 124 by reference to both domestic and international law.
125
In the course of elaborating upon this element of international law, the various enforcement mechanisms have outlined a number of required elements of such processes. It is clear that what this right requires will very much depend on the circumstances of the particular case; 126 thus where detention results from an administrative decision, the detainee must have recourse to a court, but where the detention results from a court procedure, the opportunity to challenge its lawfulness can be rolled into the court decision provided the court procedure observes and respects the rights of the individual. detainee would have the opportunity to mount a challenge before a "court," what this actually requires is that the challenge would be brought before a tribunal in which "the procedure followed has a judicial character and gives to the individual concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question." 128 The authority hearing the challenge must be capable of ordering the release of the detainee 129 and should be "independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with." 130 The "guarantees appropriate" to the detention and detainee in question will be entirely dependent on the particular circumstances of the case-"the scope of the obligation…is not identical in all circumstances or for every kind of deprivation of liberty." 131 Thus, while international law appears to require that detainees would be provided with an adversarial procedure 132 in which they can participate, (or be represented by an advocate), 133 the exact format of that procedure will depend on the circumstances of the case.
In times of strain or emergency, international law affords substantive flexibility to nation states in their detention policies. That said, however, the international human right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention would appear not to be subject to derogation. 134 The non-derogable nature of the right is not expressly outlined in any of the primary documents of IHRL, but has rather been implied into the right as a result of its fundamentality to the protection of detainees from violations of expressly non-derogable and jus cogens rights, such as the protection from torture. Thus, while the right to be free from arbitrary detention is subject to derogation in a time of emergency, the availability of an effective mechanism by which detainees may challenge the lawfulness of their detention is an important factor in determining the proportionality and lawfulness of the measures introduced. 135 In this respect, the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on States of Emergency, Torture and a Right to a Fair Trial have reflected on the high potential for abuse where individuals are held incommunicado, and suggested that "habeas corpus or other prompt and effective remedy" ought to be non-derogable, 136 and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights has proposed that the Principles and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, currently be drafted, would state that "[t]he writs of habeas corpus and amparo may not be denied any person arrested and charged for terrorist acts." 137 The HRC has also made it clear that the ICCPR requires that the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention through habeas corpus or an equivalent writ would remain fully available in times of emergency. In Alegre v. Peru, 138 for example, the HRC found that Peru's Decree Law No. 25659 139 violated Article 9(4) of the Convention.
This law deals with terrorist offenses including high treason, and severely restricts the possibility of people held on suspicion of such offenses challenging the lawfulness of their detention through habeas corpus petitions. While the Peruvian government argued that this was necessary in order to ensure national security, the HRC found that emergencies cannot justify the deprivation of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. 140 This case reflects the Committee's view as to the fundamentality of judicial controls of detention; they are the recognized means of both avoiding abuses and providing an effective remedy to human rights violations. 141 In October 1986, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights submitted a request for an advisory opinion from the Court as to whether the judicial protection afforded by habeas corpus can be suspended in times of emergency. The Court held that habeas corpus (and amparo) cannot be suspended in times of emergency as these judicial protections are essential guarantees to the protection of individual rights (including non-derogable rights such as the right to be free from torture) and to the "effective exercise of representative democracy." 142 While an emergency situation may necessitate a suspension of certain guarantees, the Court stressed that the Rule of Law or the principle of legality are never suspended; these continue to be the guiding principles for governance even in times of strain. 143 Judicial protections are an essential guarantee of the application and respect for these principles, and habeas corpus is the means of guaranteeing protection from what international law recognizes as the most egregious human rights violations (as defined by jus cogens and non-derogable rights). 144 These protections have a particular importance in cases of emergency, when some rights and freedoms might be suspended 145 and are therefore non-derogable.
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has never held that the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention, contained in Article 5(4) of the ECHR, is non-derogable. Rather, the Court has consistently taken the continuing availability of habeas corpus to suspected terrorist detainees, to be a relevant factor in assessing the proportionality of emergency-related periods of protracted detention without charge or trial. 146 Admittedly, the Court's reasoning has generally been somewhat weak on this matter: as a general principle, the Court merely considered whether or not the petition was available to a detainee and did not interrogate the extent to which habeas corpus processes would constitute a substantive review of lawfulness in any particular circumstance. That notwithstanding, however, later litigation relating to Northern Ireland indicated something of a shift in this respect, with the Strasbourg court actually engaging in a deep review of the nature and effectiveness of the habeas corpus petition available to suspected terrorists. Thus, in Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom 147 the Court noted that not only ought suspected terrorists be in a position to challenge the reasonableness of a police officer's belief that he was involved in terrorist activities, but also that the police officer's belief was not to be deemed reasonable if based on slender materials, such as prior convictions. In other words, the exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the notion of "reasonableness" to the point where the essence of the right to liberty would be impaired. 148 Fox et al. at least suggests that the European Court of Human Rights is concerned not only with the availability of a review, but with the availability of a meaningful and adequate review, appropriate to ensuring that the right to liberty is not covertly undermined through ineffective review processes. As a result, it seems reasonable to suggest that in a future apposite case, the Strasbourg court might follow its international and regional counterparts and elevate Article 5(4) to the status of impliedly non-derogable rights.
Thus, IHRL has much to offer domestic legal systems in terms of elucidation of the vital component parts of an effective and appropriate review process that vindicates the right to be free from arbitrary detention, or the right to liberty. Counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene could certainly have drawn on this rich stream of jurisprudence in order to bolster its argument that the CSRT process does not offer an "adequate alternative" to habeas corpus.
IV. Understanding the Lack of IHRL Argumentation
The preceding section outlines the rich body of IHRL that remained un-mined by counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene in spite of its relevance. Given the strength of international human rights standards for the petitioners' case, the failure to avail of that body of law is worthy of some contemplation. It can not reasonably be expected that counsel for the petitioners were unaware of the law outlined above-after all, the extraterritorial application of human rights law and the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention have been among the most topical areas of scholarship and indeed litigation in the War on Terrorism, particularly in the Superior Courts of the United Kingdom. 149 It is more reasonable to assume that IHRL was deliberately and strategically omitted from arguments for the petitioners. This part of the Article considers two possible explanations for this: first, the uncertain status of IHRL in municipal US law, and second, the pervasiveness of the view that IHRL is irrelevant and indeed inappropriate in the context of the post-9/11 counter-terrorist campaign.
It might be the case that counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene failed to argue international human rights norms because of the unfavorable status of these norms in the United States. Once a treaty has been concluded by the President in accordance with the requirements of Article II of the Constitution it then becomes the "law of the land" by virtue of its inclusion in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. 150 151 and has instead developed its own categorization of treaties which then dictates the actions needed for the implementation of treaties in domestic law: self-executing and non-self-executing.
This distinction was introduced by Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
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In other words, if a treaty creates an obligation to carry out a certain act, that requires action by a branch of government that holds the constitutional obligation to engage in such behavior (e.g. making something a criminal offense), the treaty will be seen as non-self-executing and therefore require implementation by Congress. All other treaties will be self-executing and become part of domestic law without any Congressional intervention. Importantly, even non-self-executing treaties will bind the United States in their relations with other treaty parties; they simply fail to be enforceable in the United States courts. This distinction is expressly accepted in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law which states that "[c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self-executing' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation." 153 It is now generally accepted that international human rights treaties are never self-executing 154 and therefore not internally binding on the United States unless they have actually been incorporated and, thereby, executed by Congress. The ratification of the ICCPR by the United States in 1992 was done subject to a Senate declaration that "the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing."
155 Although the Senate stated that the declaration was meant to "clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts," 156 this does not appear to bar reliance on the Covenant and jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee to argue for a contemporary and human rights compliant interpretation of the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.
International human rights norms are not, of course, merely confined to treaty provisions; they can also take the form of customary international law. The law of the United States has, until recently, accepted almost without question the proposition that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
157 International law, in this context, refers to customary international law, which is said to be federal common law. 158 As a result of the Supreme Court's long-standing position, that it would apply customary international law "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision," 159 what is known as the "last in time" rule has emerged. According to this rule, customary international law can be overridden in domestic law by a contrary domestic enactment.
Given the capacity of the domestic institutions to override international law, it may well have been the case that counsel for the petitioners felt they were on more secure ground in making primarily constitutional arguments. That said, however, the somewhat insecure status of international law in the United States did not preclude reliance on these standards in order to argue that constitutional norms themselves ought to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with, and influenced by, international law. Indeed, international standards have frequently played a role in the elucidation of contemporary understandings of constitutional standards. If, as Diane Amann has noted, comparative standards are often relied upon by the Supreme Court "when circumstances warrant" it, 161 the same might be said of IHRL. If such an argument by analogy, with reference to comparative law had been made, it would have pointed strongly towards consideration of IHRL in this case.
Amann identifies two important factors in discerning which cases warrant consideration of and reliance on "external norms": (1) where these norms have been formed through the consideration of analogous questions in analogous circumstances to those currently before the law, and (2) where the norms emanate from nations or systems that share the United States' commitment to fundamental rights. Applying these criteria to the current litigation, it becomes clear that there would be nothing novel about reliance on external norms, including those emanating from IHRL in the current circumstances. Norms and standards relating to the availability and essential features of the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention have been shaped in international law through, inter alia, considerations of the operation of this right in respect of suspected terrorists and states under threat from terrorist activity. In addition, IHRL not only share a commitment to fundamental rights with the United States, but have in fact been substantially shaped by the United States and "illuminate [the U.S.'] constitutional values of liberty, equality, property." 162 Thus it would have been appropriate and, indeed, in line with constitutional practice, to rely on international law in order to enrich, and attempt to shape the meaning and reach of constitutional standards in Boumediene.
A further reason for the reluctance to rely on international human rights norms in the Boumediene litigation may well lie in an implicit acceptance of the Administration's position that IHRL has no relevance in the context of Guantánamo Bay. This position is based on two fundamentally flawed premises: (1) that international humanitarian law entirely displaces IHRL in times of armed conflict as a result of the lex specialis rule, and (2) that IHRL is not binding on the United States outside of its own territorial borders. The second of these premises is clearly disproved by the principle that, while international human rights norms are usually territorially limited, they can be subject to extra-territorial application in exceptional circumstances, including where the U.S. has effective control over an area as it does over Guantánamo Bay. The former premise is, however, worthy of more sustained consideration.
While it was originally thought that international humanitarian law and IHRL were best seen as completely distinct bodies of law that would not apply in parallel to one another, this position has been generally rejected since the 1960s. 163 While this complementary conception of the relationship between the two bodies of law has not displaced the lex specialis rule, it has perhaps changed its nature to a rule that recognises that a "more specific norm … supplements the more general one without contradiction"; 164 167 It has also been reiterated by both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 168 and the European Court of Human Rights. 169 Thus, while the Supreme Court has recognized the applicability of international humanitarian law to the War on Terrorism in Hamdan 170 and had, as a result, recognized Al Qaeda detainees as rights-bearers under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 171 this did not preclude argumentation from IHRL. Although counsel for the respondent would inevitably have argued that IHRL had no relevance in times of armed conflict, the petitioners could certainly have constructed a strong argument for the relevance of IHRL based on the contemporary operation of the lex specialis rule.
The Administration's position, therefore, ought not to have resulted in the petitioners neglecting IHRL completely. In fact, the decision to all but ignore IHRL, reads as a concession to the Administration's position that domestic law has a monopoly on the treatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees. This decision is lamentable on both practical and doctrinal levels. On a practical level it is to be lamented because the protections afforded by an understanding of constitutional standards informed by cotemporary international norms arguably affords more secure protection to suspected terrorists. On a doctrinal level it is to be lamented because it acquiesces in a view of domestic law, as a thing untouched by international standards and understandings of individual rights, that is not only antiquated but also out of step with the original conception of U.S. law, which seems to have been one of a body of rules receptive to (if not occasionally in need of) external influence. 172 The exclusion of international law in this litigation is intellectually incomprehensible-although Section 5 of the Military Commissions Act 2006 expressly prohibits reliance on the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in habeas corpus or other proceedings taken by enemy combatants, some minor references to the Conventions are to be found in the argumentation and, in any case, the litigation constitutes a challenge to this legislation. Thus, Section 5 is equally insufficient as an explanation for counsel's decision to side-line IHRL in this case. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to read this strategic decision as anything other than one that indicates a willingness to play out the drama of Guantanamo detainees' rights on the pitch chosen by the administration, rather than to change its intellectual location through the injection of contextually relevant international legal standards.
V. Conclusion
Although the petitioners in Boumediene constructed strong arguments on the reach of the Constitution and the content of habeas corpus based on domestic law, this Article 172 Critics of the Supreme Court's intervention in the War on Terrorism frequently cite to the Founders in order to support their position that decision in "wartime" ought to be taken by the Executive alone, or perhaps sometimes with the compliance of Congress, and that the judiciary ought to remove itself from such considerations. shows that IHRL offers persuasive supporting arguments that, if accepted, may well have allowed for a broader and more rights-protecting conclusion than reliance on domestic law alone. In addition, such reliance on international law would also have offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to make an important statement about the relationship between human rights law and the individual liberties protected in the U.S. Constitution and the capacity of international standards to enrich domestic constitutional standards. By failing to make the two exceptionally persuasive IHRL arguments available to them, counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene missed an opportunity to reorient the legal dispute on the habeas corpus entitlements of suspected terrorists held in Guantánamo Bay and to afford the justices of the Supreme Court the chance to draw conclusions on the continuing relevance of human rights law in a post-9/11 world analogous to their assertion of international humanitarian law applicability in the Hamdan decision.
